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NOTES 
Employment Discrimination Claims Under ERISA Section 
510: Should Courts Require Exhaustion of Arbitral and 
Plan Remedies? 
Jared A. Goldstein 
!Nrn.ODUCTION 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA)1 regulates employer-sponsored welfare and pension 
plans2 in two distinct ways. Frrst, it requires plan administrators to 
provide benefits according to the terms of the plans. If a plan ad-
ministrator wrongfully denies a benefit guaranteed by the plan, the 
beneficiary can sue in federal court to recover the benefit.3 Courts 
refer to such claims as "benefits claims."4 These claims amount to 
breach-of-contract actions and require courts to construe the terms 
of BRISA-governed plans in order to determine whether the plan 
owes the plaintiff benefits.5 , 
Second, BRISA establishes minimum standards to govern plans 
and the actions of plan fiduciaries. Minimum standards established 
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 
(1988) and in scattered sections of the I.R.C. (1988)). 
2. ERISA defines two types of plans covered by the Act. Employee welfare benefit plans 
or "welfare plans" include plans that provide "medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, 
or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation 
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or 
prepaid legal services." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (1988). Employee pension benefit plans or 
"pension plans" are those plans that "provide[] retirement income to employees, or .•. 
result[] in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of 
covered employment or beyond." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1988). 
3. ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B) provides that a participant or beneficiary may bring a civil ac-
tion "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under 
the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1988). In addition, ERISA § 404(a) establishes that plan fiducia-
ries must adhere to plan documents: "A fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a 
plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and ... in accordance with the 
documents and instruments governing the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l) (1988). 
4. See, e.g., Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co., 987 F.2d 1017, 1027 (4th Cir. 1993); Horan v. 
Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan, 947 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1991); McMahan v. New England 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 888 F.2d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 1989); Leonelli v. Pennwalt Corp., 887 F.2d 
1195, 1199 (2d Cir. 1989). 
5. Cf. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (holding that ERISA 
§§ 502(a)(l)(B) and 514(a) preempt a state breach-of-contract action based on a violation of 
the terms of a plan). 
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by BRISA include vesting schedules that pension plans must meet6 
and broad fiduciary obligations to which plan administrators must 
adhere.7 BRISA provides plan participants and beneficiaries a fed-
eral cause of action to enforce these standards.8 Courts character-
ize such claims as "statutory claims,"9 which require courts to 
interpret the provisions of BRISA itself.10 
. BRISA section 510,11 the subject of this Note, provides one of 
the statutory rights guaranteed by BRISA. Section 510 prohibits 
employers both from discriminating against an employee on the ba-
sis of her eligibility for benefits and from retaliating against an em-
ployee for asserting her rights under BRISA: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, 
discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for ex-
ercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an 
employee benefit plan [or] this title ... or for the purpose of interfer-
ing with the attainment of any right to which such participant may 
become entitled under the plan [or this title ].12 
Section 510 amounts to antidiscrimination legislation. One court 
has analogized the protection offered by section 510 to that offered 
by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act:13 "As Title VII prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race with respect to such employ-
ment, so does section 510 prohibit discrimination with respect to 
pension benefits on the basis of one's proximity to such benefits. "14 
6. ERISA § 203 requires pension plans to provide participants a nonforfeitable right to 
their accrued benefits after no more than seven years. 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1988). 
7. These obligations include the requirements that fiduciaries perform their duties in ac-
cordance with the "prudent man" standard of trust law, that fiduciaries act for the exclusive 
benefit of participants and beneficiaries, and that fiduciaries act in accordance with plan doc-
uments. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988). 
8. ERISA § 502(a}(3) provides a cause of action to a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary 
"(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter ... or (B) 
to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any 
provisions of this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a}(3} (1988). 
9. See, e.g., Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 665 (2d Cir. 1994); Amaro v. Continental 
Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1984} ("This statutory claim is not for benefits under a 
collective bargaining agreement." (emphasis added)}; Air Line Pilots Assn. v. Northwest Air-
lines, 627 F.2d 272, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
10. See Amaro, 724 F.2d at 751 ("We are faced solely with an alleged violation of a pro· 
tection afforded by ERISA ... [T)here is only a statute to interpret."); Kross v. Western 
Elec. Co., 701F.2d1238, 1244 (7th Cir. 1983) ("It is clear from the language of§ 502(a) ••• 
that § 502(a)(l) encompasses civil actions for violations of the terms of a benefit plan, while 
§ 502(a)(3} authorizes civil actions for violations of the provisions of ERISA itself."). 
11. 29 u.s.c. § 1140 (1988). 
12. 29 u.s.c. § 1140 (1988). 
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
14. Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 847 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting McLendon 
v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1503-04 (D.NJ. 1985)); see also EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS COMM., ABA, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 529 (1991) ("Section 510 of ERISA is an 
antidiscrimination in employment and antiretaliation statute similar in concept to the 
ADEA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Rehabilitation Act."). 
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Unlike Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
personal characteristics such as race, religion, and sex, section 510 
explicitly prohibits employers from discriminating for purely eco-
nomic reasons.15 For instance, one employee e~tablished a prima 
facie case of discrimination under section 510 by showing that her 
employer fired her in order to prevent her from becoming eligible 
for .substantial disability benefits.16 In another case, an employee 
established a prima facie case of a section 510 violation by showing 
that his employer discharged him to prevent him from qualifying 
for an additional $550,000 in pension benefits.17 
Although BRISA provides a federal cause of action to enforce 
section 510, BRISA-governed plans themselves may provide a pri-
vate mechanism for reviewing the actions of plan administrators.18 
Additionally, employment contracts and collective bargaining 
agreements frequently specify private arbitration as the exclusive 
means for handling employment disputes.19 In the context of plan 
remedies, courts typically defer to the determinations of plan ad-
In analyzing § 510 claims, courts often explicitly apply Title VII principles in allocating 
burdens of proof. Thus, as in a Title VII claim, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of estab-
lishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Dister v. Continental Group, Inc. 859 F.2d 1108, 
1111-12 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 
252-53 (1981)); Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 852 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802 (1973)). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer then must articu-
late a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the allegedly discriminatory action. 859 F.2d 
at 1112; 812 F.2d at 853. If the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff must then attempt to 
show that the employer's decision was based on an unlawful motive, either through direct 
evidence of discrimination or by proving that the employer's articulated reason is unworthy 
of credence. 859 F.2d at 1112; 812 F.2d at 853. 
15. Another important distinction between § 510 and Title VII is that, unlike Title VII, 
ERISA preempts otherwise applicable state law. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988); see Ingersoll-
Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990) (holding that ERISA § 510 preempts a state 
wrongful discharge claim). Thus, § 510 offers employees their only protection against actions 
by their employers - including firing - intended to prevent employees from obtaining pen-
sion, disability, or other benefits under employer-sponsored plans. 
16. See Zipf v. AT&T, 799 F.2d 889, 891-93 (3d Cir. 1986). 
17. Dister, 859 F.2d at 1114-15. Although the typical § 510 case alleges wrongful dis-
charge, other employer actions may also give rise to a successful § 510 claim. For instance, an 
employee stated a § 510 claim in alleging that his employer fraudulently induced him to 
waive his rights to benefits under the employer's pension plan. See Healy v. Axelrod Constr. 
Co. Defined Benefit Pension Plan & Trust, 787 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
18. See BRISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988) (requiring plans to include a procedure for 
appealing denials of benefits); infra notes 39, 70-73 and accompanying text. 
19. In 1975, the Department of Labor estimated that 96.1 % of collective bargaining 
agreements included a grievance and arbitration system. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, CHARACrERISTICS OF MAJOR CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREE-
MENTS, JULY 1, 1975, tbls. 8.1-8.2 (1977). An extensive 1989 survey found that 98% of sam-
ple contracts contained arbitration provisions. See BUREAU OF NATL. AFFAIRS, BASIC 
PATTERNS JN UNION CoNTRAcrs 37 (12th ed. 1989) [hereinafter BNA, BASIC PATTERNS]. 
Although the Department of Labor does not maintain comparable statistics for individual 
employment contracts, arbitration agreements may be becoming increasingly prevalent for 
individual employees. See Steven A. Holmes, Some Employees Lose Right to Sue for Bias at 
Work, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1994, at Al ("Prompted largely by fears that federal juries will 
grant large monetary awards in bias cases, more and more companies are requiring their 
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ministrators, upholding their conclusions unless they are "arbitrary 
and capricious."2° Courts review the decisions of private arbitrators 
with even greater deference, upholding arbitral decisions unless the 
award is "completely irrational or evidences a 'manifest disregard 
for law' "21 or the arbitrator exceeds the scope of her authority.22 
Federal courts disagree over whether to require plaintiffs to ex-
haust private dispute mechanisms before bringing section 510 
claims to court. The Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits gener-
ally require section 510 claimants to exhaust the appeal procedures 
provided by BRISA-governed plans before they may sue in federal 
court.23 The Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, 
have held that the text and legislative history of BRISA do not pro-
vide evidence of a congressional intent to require exhaustion of 
plan remedies.24 The courts also disagree over whether plaintiffs 
must exhaust arbitral remedies.25 The Ninth Circuit has held that 
section 510 claims are not subject to otherwise valid arbitration 
clauses on the grounds that only the federal judiciary can enforce 
the rights protected by section 510.26 The Second, Third, Eighth, 
and Eleventh Circuits have concluded otherwise and have upheld 
employees to submit claims of discrimination, including sexual harassment, to binding 
arbitration."). 
20. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108-15 (1989), the Supreme 
Court held that courts should review discretionary decisions of plan administrators under the 
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. 
21. Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 885 (8th Cir. 1993). 
22. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 594, 597 (1960). 
23. See Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that ERISA statu-
tory claims are generally subject to an exhaustion requirement, although an exception to the 
requirement applied in the instant case); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219, 
1227 (11th Cir. 1985), cerl denied, 474 U.S. 1087 (1986); Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 
1238, 1245 (7th Cir. 1983). 
24. See Held v. Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990); 
Zipfv. AT&T, 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986); Amaro v. Continental Can Co. 724 F.2d 747 {9th 
Cir. 1984). 
25. In some ways, it may be misleading to refer to the issue of whether plaintiffs must 
arbitrate § 510 claims as an issue of exhaustion. Exhaustion typically refers to whether a 
claimant must seek review before resorting to court. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying 
text. In contrast, when an arbitration agreement covers a claim, claimants must usually resort 
to the arbitral forum instead of going to court. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory 
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to 
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."). Perhaps partly because limited 
judicial review of arbitral decisions is available in court, however, courts tend to discuss the 
issue as one of exhaustion. See, e.g., Mason, 763 F.2d at 1222; Amaro, 124 F.2d at 750. More-
over, exhaustion in this context also refers to the situation in which courts require plaintiffs to 
pursue arbitration of contract disputes before bringing claims for statutory ERISA violations. 
See 724 F.2d at 752 ("A trial court can stay any statutory claim that arises out of substantially 
the same facts present in an ongoing administrative or arbitral proceeding."). 
26. See 724 F.2d at 750-51. 
October 1994] Note - ERISA § 510 Exhaustion Requirements 197 
arbitration agreements covering statutory BRISA claims such as 
section 510 claims.21 
This Note examines whether courts should require section 510 
claimants to exhaust either plan-based or arbitral remedies before 
seeking judicial relief. It begins by comparing the basis for an ex-
haustion requirement with respect to benefits claims with the basis 
for such a requirement with respect to statutory claims - like those 
under section 510. Part I examines the rationale courts have of-
fered for requiring exhaustion of plan remedies for benefits claims. 
Part I concludes that federal courts have correctly determined that 
Congress intended individuals bringing benefits claims to exhaust 
the remedies provided by the plan before seeking judicial relief. 
Part II argues, however, that courts should not impose an exhaus-
tion of plan remedies requirement for statutory claims such as sec-
tion 510 claims because neither the text nor the legislative history of 
BRISA indicates that Congress intended to require exhaustion for 
statutory claims. Part II further argues that even if courts generally 
apply an exhaustion requirement to statutory BRISA claims, they 
should waive this requirement for most claims brought under sec-
tion 510 by applying the judicially recognized exceptions to exhaus-
tion for futility and inadequate remedies. 
Having determined that BRISA does not require exhaustion of 
plan-based remedies before plaintiffs may bring section 510 claims, 
this Note then turns to the related issue of whether courts should 
require section 510 claimants to exhaust contractually agreed-upon 
arbitral remedies. Part III argues that under recent Supreme Court 
decisions the determination of whether section 510 claims are sub-
ject to arbitration depends on whether the arbitration agreement is 
governed by the Labor Management Relations Act or the Federal 
Arbitration Act. This determination, in tum, depends on the type 
of contract containing the arbitration agreement - whether the ar-
bitration agreement appears in a collective bargaining agreement, a 
commercial contract, or an individual employment contract. Part 
III then concludes that under relevant Supreme Court precedent 
courts should not require those bringing a section 510 claim to ex-
haust arbitration specified by a collective bargaining agreement. 
Courts should, however, require exhaustion of arbitral remedies 
when the arbitration agreement is found in an individual employ-
ment contract or a commercial contract. 
27. See Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that, in general, ERISA statutory claims are subject to arbitration under the Federal 
Arbitration Act); Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 
1991) (same); Arnulfo P. Sulit, Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 
1988) (same); Mason, 763 F.2d at 1224 (holding that ERISA claims are subject to arbitration 
under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement). 
198 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:193 
I. THE EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES REQUIREMENT 
All courts agree that those seeking to recover wrongfully denied 
benefits must exhaust the appeals procedures provided by the plan 
before bringing suit in federal court.28 Some courts have expanded 
the reach of the exhaustion requirement beyond these benefits 
claims and apply it also to statutory claims.29 These courts find that 
the rationale for requiring exhaustion in the context of benefits 
claims applies to all ERISA claims, including section 510 claims.3o 
This Part examines the rationale for applying an exhaustion of rem-
edies requirement to benefits claims in order to set the stage for a 
similar analysis of statutory claims in Part II. Section I.A explores 
the development of the exhaustion requirement in the context of 
benefits claims. Section I.B describes another aspect of exhaustion 
doctrine, the judicially recognized exceptions to the requirement. 
This Part provides the framework that will be employed in Part II 
to determine whether the rationale for requiring exhaustion in the 
context of benefits claims applies in the section 510 context as well. 
A. Foundation of the Exhaustion Requirement 
In the federal labor law context, courts have applied an exhaus-
tion of remedies requirement as a means of accommodating two 
potentially conflicting policies - providing access to the courts and 
encouraging private resolution of disputes. On the one hand, sec-
tion 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 
(LMRA)31 provides a federal cause of action to those claiming a 
violation of a collective bargaining agreement.32 On the other 
28. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS CoMM., ABA, supra note 14, at 498 {"In general, a partici-
pant or beneficiary may not bring an action in state or federal court under Section 
502{a){l)(B) for benefits under the plan unless he has first exhausted the plan's internal 
claims procedure, including appeals."); James S. Ray, Overview of ER/SA Title I Enforce· 
ment: Procedural Aspects, in ALI-ABA CouRSE OF Sroov: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LmoA-
TION 385, 417 {1994); Whitman F. Manley, Note, Civil Actions Under ER/SA Section 502(a): 
When Should Courts Require That Claimants Exhaust Arbitral or Intraftmd Remedies?, 71 
CORNELL L. REv. 952, 958 (1986) {"Courts uniformly hold that the failure of a participant to 
exhaust internal review procedures when challenging a benefit denial under the terms of a 
benefit plan will bar his subsequent suit under ERISA section 502(a)(l)(B)."). 
29. See Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 974 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the ex-
haustion doctrine applies to a claim under ERISA § 204(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (1988), 
which prohibits employers from amending pension plans to eliminate or decrease early re-
tirement benefits or subsidies); Mason, 763 F.2d at 1227 {holding that the exhaustion require-
ment applies to statutory ERISA claims); Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1244 
(7th Cir. 1983) (same). 
30. See 763 F.2d at 1227 ("[I]mposing an exhaustion requirement [for ERISA statutory 
claims] appears to be consistent with the intent of Congress that pension plans provide in-
trafund review procedures."); 701 F.2d at 1245 (concluding that "well-established federal pol-
icy, and supporting case law, favoring exhaustion of administrative remedies" applies to 
statutory claims as well as benefits claims). 
31. 29 u.s.c. § 185 (1988). 
32. LMRA § 301(a) provides: 
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hand, LMRA section 203( d) establishes a policy of encouraging the 
development of private grievance procedures to settle workplace 
disputes.33 In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,34 the Supreme Court 
resolved the tension inherent in these provisions .by requiring those 
claiming a violation of a collective bargaining agreement to exhaust 
the agreement's grievance procedure before bringing a federal 
cause of action.3s 
Like the LMRA, BRISA provides access to courts but also en-
courages private resolution of disputes. BRISA itself declares that 
one of its primary purposes is to provide participants and benefi-
ciaries "ready access to the Federal courts."36 Section 502(a)(l)(B) 
helps implement this goal by creating a cause of action for plan par-
ticipants and beneficiaries to recover wrongfully denied benefits.37 
Standing alone, section 502(a)(l)(B) creates no special procedural 
barriers for those bringing a claim for benefits. BRISA section 503, 
however, requires plans to include an internal procedure for re-
viewing denials of benefits.38 In contrast to section 502(a)(l)(B), 
section 503 expressly anticipates private dispute resolution. Noth-
ing in the text of BRISA indi~ates how, or if, Congress intended 
these two provisions to work together. Applying a doctrine that 
developed in labor law, courts have resolved this apparent tension 
by requiring those seeking benefits to exhaust plan remedies before 
bringing suit.39 
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization represent-
ing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between 
any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States 
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or with-
out regard to the citizenship of the parties. 
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988). 
33. LMRA § 203(d} states: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is 
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the 
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." 29 U.S.C. 
§ 173(d} (1988). 
34. 379 U.S. 650 (1965). 
35. 379 U.S. at 652 ("As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor 
policy requires that individual employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt 
use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of 
redress."). 
36. 29 U.S.C. § lOOl(b} (1988). 
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1988). 
38. Under § 503, all plans must establish procedures that "afford a reasonable opportu-
nity to any participant whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by 
the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim." 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988). 
39. In Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1980), the court decided to follow "[t]he 
usual rule in the field of labor law": 
[W]here administrative procedures have been instituted for the resolution of disputes 
between parties to a collectively bargained or other agreement, the courts will generally 
require the exhaustion of those procedures before exercising the jurisdiction they might 
otherwise have over disputes subject to resolution through said procedures. 
618 F.2d at 566; see Baxter v. C.A. Muer Corp., 941 F.2d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1991); Springer v. 
Wal-Mart Assocs.' Group Health Plan, 908 F.2d 897, 899 (11th Cir. 1990); Leonelli v. 
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BRISA's requirement that plans include an appeals procedure 
implies a congressional understanding that those bringing benefits 
claims in federal court would first resort to the plan procedures. As 
the courts have noted, section 503 was "intended by Congress to 
help reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits under BRISA; to pro-
mote the consistent treatment of claims for benefits; to provide a 
nonadversarial method of claims settlement; and to minimize the 
costs of claims settlement for all concerned. "40 Plan remedies 
would not fulfill these purposes if claimants could avoid the proce-
dure by going directly to court. As the Ninth Circuit stated: "It 
would certainly be anomalous if the same good reasons that pre-
sumably led Congress and the Secretary to require covered plans to 
provide administrative remedies for aggrieved claimants did not 
lead courts to see that those remedies are regularly used. "41 
The legislative history of BRISA further demonstrates a con-
gressional intent to require exhaustion for benefits claims. The con-
ference report accompanying BRISA declares that in adjudicating 
benefits claims courts should follow the procedures established for 
LMRA section 301.42 As noted above, the Supreme Court has read 
section 301 of the LMRA to require exhaustion of the grievance 
procedures furnished by a collective bargaining agreement.43 Thus, 
the conference report suggests that, just as section 301 requires the 
exhaustion of collective bargaining agreement grievance proce-
dures, so too does BRISA require exhaustion of plan remedies 
before a plaintiff can bring a benefits claim in federal court.44 
An exhaustion requirement for benefits claims also appears to 
comport with the purposes of BRISA. The legislative history indi-
cates that Congress sought to provide a means of resolving ques-
tions of benefits eligibility quickly and cheaply: "The [Senate 
Finance Committee] believes that all workers and plan beneficiaries 
should have the opportunity to resolve any controversy over their 
Pennwalt Corp., 887 F.2d 1195, 1199 (2d Cir. 1989); Makar v. Health Care Corp., 872 F.2d 80, 
82 (4th Cir. 1989); Denton v. First Natl. Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1300-02 (5th Cir. 1985); Wolf v. 
National Shopmen Pension Fund, 728 F.2d 182, 185 (3d Cir. 1984); Jenkins v. Teamsters Lo-
cal 705 Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 1983); see also EMPLOYEE BENEFITS COMM., 
ABA, supra note 14, at 498 (stating that the exhaustion requirement "is not found in the 
statute; instead, it has been created and uniformly accepted by the federal courts and has its 
roots in ERISA's legislative history and federal labor law"). 
40. Amato, 618 F.2d at 567; see Makar, 872 F.2d at 83; Denton, 765 F.2d at 1301; Mason v. 
Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1087 
(1986); Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1983). 
41. Amato, 618 F.2d at 567; see also Makar, 872 F.2d at 83; Denton, 765 F.2d at 1301; 
Mason, 763 F.2d at 1227; Kross, 701 F.2d at 1245; Manley, supra note 28, at 967. 
42. The report states that courts should treat § 502 claims "in similar fashion to those 
brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947." H.R. CoNP. 
REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5107. 
43. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. 
44. See Amato, 618 F.2d at 567. 
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retirement benefits under qualified plans in an inexpensive and ex-
peditious manner."45 Another committee indicated its desire to 
minimize the number of frivolous benefits suits.46 Federal courts 
have concluded that imposing a requirement that benefits claimants 
exhaust plan remedies serves these purposes.47 Plan procedures re-
duce expenses by avoiding many of the costs associated with litiga-
tion, such as filing fees and attorney's fees. In addition, an 
exhaustion requirement ensures that the cheap and quick remedy 
provided by plan procedures will be used.48 At the same time, re-
quiring exhaustion helps reduce frivolous lawsuits by weeding out 
unmeritorious claims at an early stage.49 Imposing _an exhaustion 
requirement also helps courts minimize frivolous suits by creating a 
more complete factual record for those benefits claims that do 
reach federal court.so 
Requiring exhaustion for benefits claims also serves ERISA's 
purposes by promoting the expertise of plan administrators in man-
aging BRISA-governed plans.51 The exhaustion requirement gives 
plan administrators the primary responsibility for determining eligi-
bility for benefits. Determining and reviewing benefits eligibility 
45. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 
5000. 
46. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4670, 4682. 
47. Amato, 618 F.2d at 567; see Makar v. Health Care Corp., 872 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir. 
1989); Denton v. First Natl. Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1301 (5th Cir. 1985); Mason v. Continental 
Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1087 (1986); Kross v. 
Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1983). 
48. Fiduciaries ordinarily must review appeals of benefit denials within 60 days after the 
filing of the appeal. Department of Labor regulations implementing § 503 state: 
A decision by an appropriate named fiduciary shall be made promptly, and shall not 
ordinarily be made later than 60 days after the plan's receipt of a request for review, 
unless special circumstances (such as the need to hold a hearing, if the plan procedure 
provides for a hearing) require an extension of time for processing, in which case a 
decision shall be rendered as soon as possible, but not later than 120 days after receipt of 
a request for review. 
29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-l(h) (1993). 
49. Because courts typically defer to plan administrators' decisions, see supra note 20 and 
accompanying text, plaintiffs should be less willing to incur the expense of litigation to dis-
pute an adverse decision. 
50. In Amato, the Ninth Circuit concluded: 
Finally, a primary reason for the exhaustion requirement •.. is that prior fully consid-
ered actions by pension plan trustees interpreting their plans and perhaps also further 
refining and defining the problem in given cases, may well assist the courts when they 
are called upon to resolve the controversies. 
618 F.2d at 568. This reasoning has been cited by the Eleventh Circuit in Mason, 763 F.2d at 
1227, and by the Seventh Circuit in Kross, 701 F.2d at 1245. 
51. See, e.g., 618 F.2d at 567 ("Moreover, the trustees of covered benefit plans are 
granted broad fiduciary rights and responsibilities under ERISA, •.. and implementation of 
the exhaustion requirement will enhance their ability to expertly and efficiently manage their 
funds by preventing premature judicial intervention in their decision-making processes."). 
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requires fiduciaries to interpret the terms of the plan, which per-
haps improves their familiarity with plan details.52 
The text, history, and purposes of BRISA thus suggest that ex-
haustion of plan remedies for benefits claims is a sensible require-
ment. The next section considers two exceptions to the rule. · 
B. Exceptions to Exhaustion 
Although the exhaustion requirement mandates that claimants 
ordinarily should employ plan remedies before bringing suit, courts 
have created two exceptions to the requirement. Under these ex-
ceptions, district courts have discretion to waive the exhaustion re-
quirement when resort to plan procedures would be "futile" or 
when the plan procedures provide "inadequate remedies."53 As 
with the exhaustion requirement itself, these exceptions are derived 
from labor law precedent.54 
In the context of BRISA benefits claims, the futility exception 
allows a court to waive the exhaustion requirement if the court con-
cludes that reliance on a plan's internal claims procedure would be 
unavailing, unsuccessful, or a waste of time.ss Plaintiffs can demon-
strate futility, for example, by showing that plan administrators 
have unequivocally stated that they are not entitled to benefits.s6 
Courts have also indicated that the exhaustion requirement inay be 
excused for futility when a plan administrator has displayed hostil-
ity or personal bias against the plaintiff.57 Finally, a plaintiff can 
52. See 618 F.2d at 567. 
53. See, e.g., Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961 F.2d 157, 160 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that "an 
exception should be recognized for pleading impossibility of exhaustion in cases where claims 
procedures prove futile"); Amato, 618 F.2d at 568 (" 'There are occasions when a court is 
obliged to exercise its jurisdiction and is guilty of an abuse of discretion if it does not, the 
most familiar examples perhaps being when resort to the administrative route is futile or the 
remedy inadequate.'" (quoting Winterberger v. General Teamsters Auto 'Ihlck Drivers & 
Helpers Local Union 162, 558 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1977))); see also Ray, supra note 28, at 
421-22. 
54. See Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 685 (1981) (holding that the inadequate remedies 
exception applies to cases brought under LMRA § 301); Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 
U.S. 324, 329-31 (1969) (holding that the futility exception applies to LMRA § 301 cases). 
55. See Ludwig v. NYNEX Serv. Co., 838 F. Supp. 769, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) {"The 'futil-
ity doctrine' is perhaps best understood as a term of art that considers whether, in light of 
both the claimant's and the plan administrator's actions, it is fair to require the dismissal of 
the claimant's suit pending her reapplication for benefits in accordance with the procedures 
set forth in the summary plan description.''). 
56. See Horan v. Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan, 947 F.2d 1412, 1416 (9th Cir. 1991). 
57. Cf. Denton v. Frrst Natl. Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1302 (5th Cir. 1985) {holding that with-
out a showing of hostility or bitterness on the part of plan administrators, the plaintiff failed 
to demonstrate futility); Amato, 618 F.2d at 569 (holding that the plaintiff failed to show 
futility because he had not clearly proven that plan administrators exhibited personal bias 
against him). 
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demonstrate futility by showing that she had no meaningful access 
to plan procedures.ss 
The inadequate remedies exception to the exhaustion require-
ment applies when the remedies available under the private proce-
dures would not compensate the plaintiff for the injuries she claims 
to have suffered. In the labor law context, the Supreme Court has 
held that exhaustion of collectively bargained procedures is not re-
quired when those procedures would not provide the "complete re-
lief" available in court.59 Courts have indicated that this exception 
to the exhaustion requirement may be available in the BRISA con-
text as well. 60 
These two exceptions are part and parcel of the exhaustion re-
quirement for benefits claims under BRISA. The next Part exam-
ines how this requirement, including its two exceptions, should 
apply to BRISA statutory claims. 
II. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT 
TO SECTION 510 CLAIMS 
The previous Part demonstrated that those bringing benefits 
claims must exhaust plan procedures. The application of the ex-
haustion requirement to statutory BRISA claims, however, remains 
an open question. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits infer from 
the evidence indicating a congressional intent to require exhaustion 
for benefits claims a general intent to require exhaustion for most 
BRISA claims, including statutory claims such as alleged section 
510 violations.61 These circuits conclude that the requirement of an 
internal appeals procedure indicates a congressional intent to re-
quire exhaustion in all cases.62 The general requirement that claim-
ants exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing suit, 
these courts maintain, demonstrates Congress's desire to minimize 
all types of frivolous claims.63 This Part argues to the contrary that 
58. In one illustrative case, the Eleventh Circuit found that a plan denied a claimant 
meaningful access to plan procedures because plan administrators failed to provide docu· 
ments describing the remedies available under the plan. Curry v. Contract Fabricators Inc. 
Profit Sharing Plan, 891 F.2d 842, 846-47 (11th Cir. 1990). 
59. See Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 685 (1981). 
60. See, e.g., Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 1980); Curry, 891 F.2d at 846. 
No ERISA benefits case, however, appears to have applied the exception for inadequate 
remedies. The lack of cases arising under this exception is not surprising. Benefits claimants 
seek only the benefits promised by the plan. As a result, the remedies available under plan 
procedures provide the identical relief available in court. 
61. See Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961 F.2d 157, 160 (11th Cir. 1992); Kross v. Western 
Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1245 (7th Cir. 1983). 
62. See 961 F.2d at 160; 701 F.2d at 1245. 
63. See 961 F.2d at 160 ("Policy considerations supporting the exhaustion requirement 
include reducing the number of lawsuits under ERISA."); Powell v. AT&T, 938 F.2d 823, 826 
(7th Cir. 1991) ("Congress's apparent intent in mandating internal claims procedures found 
in ERISA .•• was to minimize the number of frivolous lawsuits."). 
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the rationale for requiring exhaustion for benefits claims does not 
support imposing an exhaustion requirement for section 510 claims. 
Section II.A explores the evidence of congressional intent on which 
the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits rely and argues that this 
evidence indicates that Congress never intended, nor even antici-
pated, that section 510 claimants would utilize a plan's internal pro-
cedures. Section 510 therefore lacks the tension that the exhaustion 
requirement seeks to resolve - the tension between a congres-
sional intent to encourage private resolution of disputes and a con-
gressional intent to provide access to the courts. Section II.B 
argues that even if courts generally require exhaustion for statutory 
BRISA claims, they should nonetheless waive the requirement for 
most section 510 claims through the judicially recognized excep-
tions for futility and inadequate remedies. 
A. Evidence of Congressional Intent 
Although the exhaustion requirement is a judicial creation, its 
application turns on principles of statutory construction.64 Courts 
apply an exhaustion requirement to resolve the tension between ap-
parently conflicting congressional goals - providing access to 
courts, on the one hand, and promoting private dispute resolution, 
on the other.65 Part I demonstrated that the text, history, and pur-
poses of BRISA make application of the exhaustion requirement 
reasonable in the context of benefits claims. Nothing, however, in-
dicates that Congress intended individuals bringing claims under 
section 510 to exhaust plan remedies before bringing suit. Indeed, 
the text and legislative history of BRISA indicate that Congress 
only anticipated that plans would provide a remedy for breach of 
the plan; Congress never anticipated that plans would provide a 
procedure for handling claims based on a violation of BRISA itself. 
Courts have also concluded that requiring exhaustion for statutory claims serves the con-
gressional purpose of enhancing the expertise of fiduciaries, just as this purpose is served by 
requiring exhaustion for benefits claims. See Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 
1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that exhaustion of plan procedures "enhance[s] the plan 
trustees' ability to carry out their fiduciary duties expertly and efficiently by preventing pre-
mature judicial intervention in the decisionmaking process"), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1087 
(1986); Kross, 701 F.2d at 1245 (reaching the same conclusion). 
64. See Amato, 618 F.2d at 566 ("It is true that the text of ERISA nowhere mentions the 
exhaustion doctrine. The question therefore may be raised as to whether Congress intended 
to grant the authority to the courts to apply that doctrine to suits arising under ERISA."); 
Manley, supra note 28, at 967 (arguing that exhaustion should apply to benefits claims be-
cause "Congress specifically intended that claimants exhaust internal procedures prior to 
bringing an action under ERISA"}. 
65. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text. 
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1. Evidence from the Text of ERISA 
Some courts have relied on BRISA section 503 to support an 
exhaustion requirement for statutory claims.66 This section, how-
ever, applies only to claims for benefits. Section 503 provides: 
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary [of Labor], every em-
ployee benefit plan shall -
(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or benefici-
ary whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied, setting 
forth the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calcu-
lated to be understood by the participant, and 
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim 
for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropri-
ate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.67 
By its terms, the procedure required by section 503 covers only ben-
efits claims; section 503 says nothing about statutory claims.6s Reli-
ance on the text of section 503 to require exhaustion of plan 
remedies for section 510 claims makes little sense because section 
503 provides no remedy for section 510 plaintiffs to exhaust.69 Sec-
tion 503 thus provides no support for a congressional intent to re-
quire exhaustion for statutory claims. 
2. Evidence from the Legislative History of ERISA 
Although the legislative history of BRISA indicates a congres-
sional intent to require exhaustion for benefits claims, the legisla-
tive history suggests that this requirement should not apply to 
statutory claims. As Part I discussed, the conference report to 
BRISA states that courts should treat benefits claims according to 
principles derived from LMRA section 301, which courts have held 
to require exhaustion.70 Some courts point to this statement in the 
66. See Mason, 763 F.2d at 1227; Amato, 618 F.2d at 567. 
67. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988) (emphasis added). 
68. See Zipf v. AT&T, 799 F.2d 889, 891-92 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The provision relating to 
internal claims and appeals procedures, Section 503, refers only to procedures regarding 
claims for benefits. There is no suggestion that Congress meant for these internal remedial 
procedures to embrace Section 510 claims based on violations of ERISA's substantive 
guarantees."). 
Department of Labor regulations implementing ERISA support the conclusion that § 503 
deals only with benefits claims. These regulations speak only to the procedures for handling 
benefits claims and nowhere mention a procedure for handling statutory claims. The regula-
tions state: "This section sets out certain minimum requirements for employee benefit plan 
procedures pertaining to claims by participants and beneficiaries (claimants) for plan bene-
fits, consideration of such claims, and review of claim denials." 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-l(a) 
(1993) (emphasis added). The Department of Labor regulations, like ERIS A itself, nowhere 
suggest that the § 503 procedure applies to statutory as well as benefits claims. 
69. See Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1984) ("There is no 
internal appeal procedure either mandated or recommended by ERISA to hear these 
claims."). 
70. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 42, at 327, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5107. See supra notes 31-35, 42-44 and accompanying text. 
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conference report as evidence that Congress intended to require ex-
haustion for all BRISA claims.71 The text of the report, however, 
does not support this conclusion. The report states: 
[W]ith respect to suits to enforce benefit rights under the plan or to 
recover benefits under the plan which do not involve application of the 
title I provisions . .. [a]ll such actions in Federal or State courts are to 
be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar 
fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management 
Relations Act of 1947.72 
This statement discusses benefits claims only. More importantly, 
the conference report specifically excludes claims that "involve ap-
plication of title I provisions" from the scope of those claims that 
should be guided by LMRA section 301. Title I of BRISA specifies 
the statutory standards that govern plans and includes the antidis-
crimination protection embodied in section 510.73 The conference 
report therefore only instructs courts to apply LMRA principles -
including the exhaustion requirement - to benefits claims, not to 
statutory claims like those arising under section 510. 
B. The Applicability to Section 510 Claims of the Exceptions to 
the Exhaustion Requirement 
The previous section argued that neither the text nor the history 
of BRISA support a requirement that plaintiffs bringing statutory 
claims must exhaust plan remedies before suing in federal court. 
This section examines whether, even if an exhaustion requirement 
generally applies to statutory BRISA claims, statutory claims based 
on section 510 should fall within one of the judicially recognized 
exceptions to exhaustion. Section II.B.1 argues that the futility ex-
ception to the exhaustion requirement should apply to most section 
510 claims. Because plan administrators typically are aligned with 
the employer, resort to plan procedures to determine whether the 
employer is guilty of employment discrimination raises a strong 
possibility of bias, which makes such a resort to plan procedures 
futile. Section II.B.2 argues that the inadequate remedies exception 
should excuse the exhaustion requirement for most section 510 
71. See Denton v. First Natl. Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1301 n.9 (5th Cir. 1985); Mason v. 
Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219, 1227 {11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1087 
(1986). 
72. H.R CoNF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 42, at 327 reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5107 (emphasis added). Courts have interpreted this statement to mean that principles es-
tablished under LMRA § 301 should apply to ERISA claims. See, e.g., Mason, 763 F.2d at 
1227; Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1980). One commentator, however, 
argues that the statement actually refers only to whether ERISA actions arise under federal 
law rather than state law. See G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Stat-
utes: When Is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute" for the Courts?, 68 TEXAS L. 
REv. 509, 559 (1990). 
73. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1168 (1988). 
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claims because plan procedures typically provide only for recovery 
of plan benefits, which do not fully compensate a victim of section 
510 employment discrimination. 
1. The Futility Exception 
Under the futility exception, courts do not require exhaustion of 
plan remedies when a plaintiff can show that the private deci-
sionmaker clearly is biased against her claim, making resort to the 
plan procedures a waste of the plaintiff's time and resources.74 In 
the labor law context, the Supreme Court has held that it would be 
futile to require those alleging discrimination to submit their claims 
to arbitrators chosen by the alleged wrongdoers. In Glover v. St. 
Louis-San Francisco Railway, 75 the Supreme Court held that it 
would be a waste of time to require the plaintiffs to submit their 
race discrimination claim to " 'a group which is in large part chosen 
by the [defendants] against whom their real complaint is made.' "76 
It would be no less futile to require an employee claiming dis-
crimination under BRISA section 510 to submit her claim to the 
plan administrator when the administrator is selected by the em-
ployer. In most single-employer plans, the person designated by 
the plan to handle claims is aligned with the employer.77 BRISA 
does not require plans to appoint a disinterested decisionmaker to 
handle claims-review procedures. Rather, it only requires that the 
decisionmaker be an "appropriate named fiduciary."78 Under De-
partment of Labor regulations, this fiduciary "may be the plan ad-
ministrator or any other person designated by the plan."79 
Following these regulations, plans typically endow the employer 
with exclusive authority to decide who hears claims.so Requiring 
section 510 claimants to exhaust plan remedies, therefore, would 
force them to present their claims of discrimination to those aligned 
with the alleged wrongdoer. In fact, the person alleged to have vio-
lated section 510 may be the plan administrator herself.81 Utilizing 
plan remedies when an employee alleges discrimination by the plan 
74. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. 
75. 393 U.S. 324 (1969). 
76. 393 U.S. at 330 (quoting Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 206 (1944)). 
77. See HENRY H. PERRirr, JR., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS CLAIMS LAw AND PRACTICE 243-
44 (1990) ("Employers usually are the administrators of single-employer plans sponsored by 
them."). 
78. 29 u.s.c. § 1133 (1988). 
79. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-l{g)(2) {1993). 
80. Joseph R. Simone, Statutory Framework, Language, and Fiduciary Responsibility Pro-
visions of ER/SA, in UNDERSTANDING BRISA: AN INrRoDuCTioN TO BASIC EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS 9, 18 {1990). 
81. See, e.g., Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1986). Note that this 
creates a potential bias problem even for those multiemployer plans in which the administra-
tor is not directly selected by the claimant's employer. 
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administrator would allow the alleged wrongdoer to serve as her 
own judge. Certainly, a court cannot expect those accused of dis-
crimination to make an objective determination of their own guilt. 
Even when the decisionmaker under the plan procedure is not the 
section 510 defendant, bias inevitably arises when the plan's named 
fiduciary is drawn from management. Utilizing plan procedures in 
such cases would require the plaintiff to bring her discrimination 
claim before an official of the very organization alleged to have dis-
criminated against her. 
It is true that inJ the context of benefits claims, courts have re-
jected the argument that pursuing plan remedies would be futile 
when plan administrators are aligned with the employer.82 As in 
the context of discrimination claims, plan administrators aligned 
with the employer sponsoring the plan may have an incentive to 
deny benefits claims.83 The courts have concluded, however, that 
Congress intended plan administrators to have primary responsibil-
ity for deciding benefits claims.84 Thus, to hold that beneficiaries 
need not pursue plan procedures when administrators are aligned 
with employers would be to oust administrators from the role Con-
gress intended.85 In addition, Congress attempted to ensure the 
neutrality of plan administrators in determining benefits by impos-
ing the so-called "exclusive benefit" rule. This rule establishes that 
plan administrators must work "for the exclusive purpose" of pro-
viding benefits to participants and their beneficiaries.86 The exclu-
sive benefit rule protects benefits claimants against bias by 
imposing an enforceable fiduciary duty on plan administrators to 
determine benefits eligibility fairly.s1 
The reasons for concluding that benefits claimants must exhaust 
plan remedies even though plan administrators are aligned with the 
employer do not apply to section 510 claims. As section II.A 
demonstrated, nothing in BRISA or its legislative history suggests 
that Congress intended plan administrators to determine whether 
82. See Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 569 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that "the appeal 
procedures are not inadequate simply because they are administered by the Trustees them-
selves, rather than some 'neutral arbitrator' "); Springer v. Wal-Mart Assocs.' Group Health 
Plan, 908 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Amato); Denton v. First Natl. Bank, 765 
F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Amato). 
83. See Springer, 908 F.2d at 901 (noting the lower court finding that plan administrators 
have "an interest in holding costs down" (internal quotations omitted)); Denton, 165 F.2d at 
1303 (acknowledging that plan administrators are not neutral decisionmakers); Amato, 618 
F.2d at 569 (same). 
84. See, e.g., Amato, 618 F.2d at 569 ("The internal administration of such procedures is 
the very thing contemplated by section 503 ..• .''); Springer, 908 F.2d at 901. 
85. See, e.g., 618 F.2d at 569; 908 F.2d at 901. 
86. 29 u.s.c. § 1104 (1988). 
87. ERISA § 503 requires that appeals of benefits determinations be both "full and fair." 
29 u.s.c. § 1133 (1988). 
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an employer has discriminated against an employee. Thus, granting 
alleged victims of discrimination immediate access to the courts 
would not deprive administrators of any congressionally assigned 
functions. In addition, the exclusive benefit rule does not protect 
section 510 claimants. The rule only instructs fiduciaries to provide 
benefits to plan participants. Section 510 claimants ordinarily seek 
reinstatement and back pay, not benefits,88 and the terms of the 
exclusive benefit rule therefore do not apply. Thus, neither the 
plan administrator's statutory role nor the exclusive benefit rule 
provide reason to reject Glover's warning that victims of discrimina-
tion are unlikely to get a fair hearing from a plan administrator 
aligned with the perpetrator of the discrimination. 
2. Inadequate Remedies 
ERISA section 502(a)(3) authorizes courts to award successful 
section 510 claimants "appropriate equitable relief" adequate to 
"redress [the] violation[ ]."89 Such relief may include remedies un-
available under plan procedures.9° Courts considering the remedies 
available to prevailing section 510 plaintiffs have concluded that 
section 502(a)(3) authorizes awards suitable to return the plaintiff 
to the position in which she would have been but for the act of 
discrimination.91 A court's equitable power under section 502(a)(3) 
includes "awarding the plaintiff backpay, reinstatement to his for-
mer position, restitution of his forfeited benefits, and any other re-
lief necessary to make him whole. "92 
In contrast to the broad equitable relief courts may provide 
under ERISA section 502(a)(3), plan procedures generally ensure 
88. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
89. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988). 
90. See William C. Martucci & John L. Utz, Unlawful Interference with Protected Rights 
Under ERISA, 2 LAB. LAW. 251, 262-65 (1986). 
91. See e.g., Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1015 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Bittner v. 
Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 490 F. Supp. 534, 536 (E.D. Wis. 1980). The legislative history of 
ERISA supports the power of courts to fashion broad relief for § 510 claimants: 
The enforcement provisions have been designed specifically to provide both the Secre-
tary and participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing 
violations [of ERISA]. The intent of the Committee is to provide the full range of legal 
and equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts and to remove jurisdic-
tional and procedural obstacles which in the past appear to have hampered effective 
enforcement .... 
S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871 (emphasis 
added). This passage has led courts and commentators to conclude that the equitable power 
under ERISA § 510 "is broad enough to recreate the circumstances that would have existed 
absent an employer's illegal conduct." Folz, 594 F. Supp. at 1015; see also Terry Colling-
sworth, ERISA Section 510 - A Funher Limitation on Arbitrary Discharges, 10 INous. REL. 
LJ. 319, 343-48 (1988); Martucci & Utz, supra note 90, at 262-65. 
92. Bittner, 490 F. Supp. at 536. In some circumstances, courts may determine that 
awarding reinstatement would be inappropriate because of the antagonism between the par-
ties, and order front pay instead. Folz, 594 F. Supp. at 1018-19. 
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only that claimants will receive the benefits denied them. The 
BRISA scheme manifests only an intent to require that plan admin-
istrators make these benefits determinations fairly. Thus, section 
503, which requires plans to include a review procedure for benefits 
denials, does not anticipate that plans will make available any addi-
tional remedy other than the benefits at issue.93 Section 503 re-
quires only that plans provide for a "full and fair review" of benefit 
denials.94 If successful, those employing plan remedies can expect 
to receive only the benefits to which they were entitled under the 
plan. 
Providing an award of benefits does not make section 510 claim-
ants whole. In many cases, section 510 claimants lost their jobs 
before they would have become eligible for benefits.95 Even if 
claimants can prove that such actions were taken to prevent them 
from becoming eligible for benefits, such claimants cannot recover 
lost benefits because they had not yet become entitled to any bene-
fits. Only such equitable awards as back pay, front pay, and rein-
statement can fully redress the harm caused by this type of 
employment discrimination.96 Plan benefits provide inadequate 
remedies for discrimination under section 510; courts therefore 
should not require section 510 claimants to exhaust plan 
procedures. 
III. THE ARBITRABILITY OF SECTION 510 CLAIMS 
The previous Part argued that as a matter of statutory construc-
tion, courts should not require alleged victims of benefits-based dis-
crimination to exhaust the remedies provided by an ERISA-
govemed plan before bringing suit. A different problem arises, 
however, when the parties to a section 510 claim have agreed in a 
contract separate from the plan itself to settle their disputes through 
arbitration. As Part II argued, BRISA itself does not impose an 
exhaustion requirement. However, separate arbitration agreements 
may have independent force. Whether failure to exhaust an arbitral 
remedy should bar a section 510 claim turns not on an interpreta-
93. See supra text accompanying note 67 (quoting§ 503). 
94. 29 u.s.c. § 1133(2) (1988). 
95. See Zipf v. AT&T, 799 F.2d 889, 893 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that the plaintiff "is mak-
ing no claim for benefits and concedes that she is not entitled to disability payments" (empha-
sis added)); Folz, 594 F. Supp. at 1015 (concluding that" '(t)he inescapable inference is that 
an ulterior motive lay behind defendants' maneuvers, and that a speedy discharge, before [the 
plaintiff's] pension vested, was aimed at'" (emphasis added) (quoting Ursic v. Bethlehem 
Mines, 556 F. Supp. 571, 575 (W.D. Pa. 1983))). 
96. See Folz, 594 F. Supp. at 1016 (concluding that back pay, reinstatement, and restitu-
tion of benefits were necessary to make the plaintiff whole); Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy 
Indus., 490 F. Supp. 534, 536 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (holding that back pay, reinstatement, and 
restitution of benefits may be awarded to make plaintiffs whole). 
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tion of BRISA but on the enforceability of the arbitration 
agreement. 
The federal courts disagree over whether failure to exhaust arbi-
tral remedies constitutes a valid ground for dismissing statutory 
BRISA claims, including section 510 claims.97 The Ninth Circuit 
has held that BRISA statutory claims are not subject to arbitra-
tion.98 As a result, plaintiffs bringing section 510 claims in the 
Ninth Circuit need not exhaust arbitral remedies.99 Until Novem-
ber 1993, the Third Circuit agreed;100 then, reversing itself, it joined 
the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits in concluding that 
BRISA statutory claims are subject to arbitration.101 These circuits 
require section 510 claimants to exhaust any available arbitral 
remedies. 
This Part argues that the question whether section 510 claimants 
must exhaust arbitral remedies before resorting to court depends 
on the type of contract in which the arbitration agreement appears. 
Section III.A surveys federal law regarding the arbitration of claims 
based on statutes. Although the Supreme Court has held consist-
ently that arbitration is appropriate to resolve breach-of-contract 
claims, 102 the Court has expressed greater reluctance to enforce the 
97. Although the Supreme Court has never determined the arbitrability of§ 510 claims, 
the Court has indicated that certain statutory ERISA claims may be subject to commercial 
arbitration. In Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc. v. Bird, 493 U.S. 884 (1989), the 
Supreme Court vacated a judgment by the Second Circuit holding that claims alleging breach 
of ERISA's fiduciary standards are not subject to commercial arbitration. Drawing support 
from Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S 36 {1973), discussed infra in section III.A.2, 
the Second Circuit had concluded as a general rule that statutory ERISA claims are not 
subject to commercial arbitration. Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 871 
F.2d 292, 295-98 {2d Cir.), vacated, 493 U.S. 884 {1989). The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari, vacated the decision, and remanded the case in light of Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/ 
American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), a commercial arbitration decision. 493 U.S. at 
884-85. On remand, the Second Circuit concluded that the claim was arbitrable. Bird v. 
Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116 {2d Cir.), cert. denied, 501U.S.1251 
(1991). This case, however, does not address the arbitrability of § 510 claims. 
98. Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984). 
99. 724 F.2d at 750-52. 
100. See Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1985). 
101. Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961F.2d157 (11th Cir. 1992); Bird v. Shearson/American Express, 
Inc., 926 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1251 (1991); Arnulfo P. Sulit, Inc. v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1988). 
102. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. l, 24-25 
(1983) ("[Under the Federal Arbitration Act] any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable 
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construc-
tion of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to 
arbitrability."); Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 
430 U.S. 243, 254-55 {1977) (holding that federal labor law expresses a strong presumption 
that disputes over interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement are subject to 
arbitration). 
212 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:193 
arbitration of claims based on statutes.103 Recently, however, the 
Court has concluded that certain statutory claims may be subject to 
arbitration.104 The Court has suggested that the test for determin-
ing whether statutory claims will be subject to arbitration depends 
on whether the arbitration agreement is governed by the LMRA or 
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Section III.A shows that this, 
in turn, depends on whether the arbitration agreement appears in a 
collective bargaining agreement, a commercial contract, or an indi-
vidual employment contract. Section III.B applies these principles 
and argues that courts should require arbitration of section 510 
claims pursuant to commercial contracts but should not require ar-
bitration of section 510 claims pursuant to collective bargaining 
agreements.105 Although the Supreme Court has not yet decided 
whether courts examining arbitration pursuant to individual em-
ployment contracts should follow labor arbitration precedent or 
commercial arbitration precedent, this Part concludes that commer-
cial arbitration presents a closer analogy and that courts should re-
quire plaintiffs to exhaust arbitration pursuant to individual 
employment contracts. 
A. Federal Arbitration Law 
Federal policy, reflected in federal statutes and Supreme Court 
decisions, supports private arbitration as a means of settling private 
disputes.106 Federal law makes arbitration agreements enforceable 
in state and federal courts.107 The Supreme Court has concluded 
that parties to an arbitration agreement must pursue arbitration 
before resorting to federal court108 and that judicial review of arbi-
103. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1973) (holding that labor 
arbitration cannot resolve an employee's claim of discrimination under Title VII); Wilko v. 
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (holding that arbitration provides an inappropriate forum for 
resolving claims under the 1933 Securities Act). 
104. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) 
(reversing Wilko and holding that arbitration may resolve claims under the 1933 Securities 
Act). 
105. Professor G. Richard Shell has reached the same conclusion. See Shell, supra note 
72, at 517 (concluding that "commercial arbitration, but not labor arbitration, provides proce-
dures that are an adequate substitute for the courts to resolve all claims under ERISA"). For 
contrary views, compare Manley, supra note 28, at 972-73 (arguing that statutory ERISA 
claimants generally should not be required to submit to either commercial or labor arbitra· 
tion) with Charles S. Mishkind, Protected Rights Under Section 510 of ERISA: Avoiding 
"Something for Nothing," in ALl-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: QUALIFIED PLANS, PCs, AND 
WELFARE BENEFrrs 425, 444-45 (1991) (arguing that § 510 claims should be subject to both 
commercial and labor arbitration). 
106. See FAA§ 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988); LMRA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1988); supra 
note 102. 
107. FAA § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988); LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988). 
108. Republic Steel CofP.. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). 
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tral decisions is limited to whether the arbitrator exceeded the 
scope of her authority.109 
Until recently, however, the Supreme Court refused to require 
arbitration of claims involving alleged violations of statutes.110 
Thus, the Court held that an agreement to arbitrate "any contro-
versy" arising between two parties would not be enforced for a 
claim that federal securities law had been violated, and the plaintiff 
could bring her securities claim in federal court without resorting to 
arbitration.111 In recent years, however, the Court has changed 
course and has begun to enforce agreements to arbitrate disputes 
involving statutory questions.112 
This section examines Supreme Court decisions regarding the 
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. Section 
III.A.1 examines why federal law distinguishes between labor arbi-
tration and commercial arbitration. Section III.A.2 discusses 
Supreme Court opinions concerning arbitration of statutory claims 
in the labor law context, in which the Supreme Court has consist-
ently refused to require arbitration of statutory claims. Section 
III.A.3 explores Supreme Court opinions concerning arbitration of 
statutory claims pursuant to commercial contracts. These opinions 
enforce such arbitration. In contrast to the labor law cases, these 
cases conclude that arbitrators are competent to interpret statutes 
and that arbitration provides an appropriate forum for resolving 
statutory claims. Section III.A.4 considers the impact of the 
Court's most recent decision in this area, Gilmer v. Interstate/John-
son Lane Corp.113 Although Gilmer arises out of a commercial 
contract, the opinion confirms that arbitration pursuant to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement remains an inappropriate forum for 
resolving statutory claims because of the tension between individual 
rights and collective representation. 
1. The Distinction Between Labor Arbitration and Commercial 
Arbitration 
Arbitration may be fairly divided into two categories: labor ar-
bitration and commercial arbitration. Each category of arbitration 
is governed by its own statutory authority and body of precedent, 
109. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1960). 
110. See supra note 103-04 and accompanying text. 
111. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 n.15 (1953). 
112. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 
(1989) (overruling Wilko and holding that claims under federal securities laws are subject to 
arbitration agreements); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614 (1985) (holding that claims under federal antitrust laws are subject to arbitration 
agreements). 
113. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
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each employs its own procedures, and each is seen by the courts as 
serving different functions.114 
Labor arbitration refers to arbitration governed by section 301 
of the LMRA.115 Labor arbitration represents the final stage of the 
grievance procedure provided by most collective bargaining agree-
ments.116 Professor G. Richard Shell has succinctly described the 
labor arbitration process as follows: 
Essentially, employees have the right under the collective-bargaining 
agreement to file a grievance if they feel their rights have been vio-
lated under the labor contract. Once filed, however, the grievance is 
handled by the union, not the individual employee . ... 
If, after presenting the grievance to the company, the union is dis-
satisfied with the result, it may pursue the claim through successively 
higher levels of grievance machinery. 
If the parties cannot resoive the dispute through the grievance 
process, the union may invoke arbitration under the arbitration provi-
sion of the collective bargaining agreement. The union and manage-
ment select an arbitrator, who then holds hearings. In these 
proceedings, the employee's interests are represented by the union, 
which typically uses a business agent whose full-time job is dealing 
with grievances.117 
The unique and crucial aspect of labor arbitration is that the union 
- not the individual employee - controls when and how to pro-
ceed with arbitration.118 In so doing, the union must only fulfill its 
duty of fair representation, which it fulfills so long as it acts in good 
faith and in a nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory fashion.119 
Federal law has long supported this form of arbitration as a 
means of resolving labor disputes and avoiding the problems associ-
114. As Shell observes: 
Scholars have long noted two models of the arbitration process. Under the first model, 
arbitration is viewed as a form of extended negotiation between highly interdependent 
parties. The first model requires arbitrators to act as agents of the parties and formulate 
compromises on difficult matters of contract interpretation, thereby preserving the par-
ties' relationship. Under the second model, arbitration is a cheap and efficient form of 
trial for resolving transactional disputes. The second model requires arbitrators to act as 
judges. 
Labor arbitration under LMRA section 301 has aspired to the first model ..•• By 
contrast, commercial arbitration under the FAA has molded its procedures to fit the 
second model. 
Shell, supra note 72, at 512. 
115. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988); see Shell, supra note 72, at 518 (noting that the Supreme 
Court has "develop[ed] a federal common law of labor arbitration under section 301 of the 
LMRA"). 
116. See BNA, BAs1c PATTERNS, supra note 19, at 38 (noting that 98% of union contracts 
sampled contained arbitration provisions); FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How 
ARBITRATION WORKS 153 (4th ed. 1985). 
117. Shell, supra note 72, at 519-20 (emphases added) (citations omitted). 
118. See ELKouru & ELKOURI, supra note 116, at 175-80 (discussing representation of 
employees in grievance proceedings). 
119. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). 
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ated with strikes, lockouts, and boycotts.120 As the Supreme Court 
has noted, the labor arbitrator performs a unique role in the rela-
tions between the parties to a labor contract: 
The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to 
the courts .... 
. . . The parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance 
will reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the . . . 
agreement permits, such factors as the effect on productivity of a par-
ticular result, its consequences on the morale of the shop, his judg-
ment whether tensions will be heightened or diminished.121 
Shell has also noted that "a substantial amount of evidence indi-
cates that arbitrators often split the difference between the conflict-
ing parties rather than render an 'all-or-nothing' decision. Such 
decisions echo the overall purpose of labor arbitration - keeping 
industrial peace."122 
The role of labor arbitrators is strictly limited to interpreting the 
terms of collective bargaining agreements. As the Supreme Court 
has stated, "[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and appli-
cation of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dis-
pense his own brand of industrial justice."123 In fact, if an arbitral 
decision is "based solely upon the arbitrator's view of the require-
ments of enacted legislation," the arbitrator has exceeded the scope 
of his authority and the award will not be enforced.124 
In contrast to labor arbitration, commercial arbitration simply 
represents an alternative to a judicial forum. Commercial arbitra-
tion refers to arbitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act 
of 1925.125 The FAA establishes that, as a matter of substantive 
federal law applicable in state and federal courts, courts must en-
force all agreements to arbitrate existing or future disputes as long 
as the underlying contract affects interstate commerce.126 The FAA 
excludes from its coverage, however, "contracts of employment of 
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged 
in foreign or interstate commerce."127 The Court has nonetheless 
enforced arbitration provisions contained in collective bargaining 
120. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960) 
(observing that arbitration "substitutes a regime of peaceful settlement for the older regime 
of industrial conflict"); Shell, supra note 72, at 518. 
121. 363 U.S. at 581-82. 
122. Shell, supra note 72, at 521-22; see NOEL ARNOLD LEVIN, SUCCESSFUL LABOR RE-
LATIONS 229 (1978). 
123. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 
124. 363 U.S. at 597. 
125. 9 u.s.c. §§ 1-15 (1988). 
126. 9 u.s.c. § 2 (1988). 
127. 9 u.s.c. § 1 (1988). 
216 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:193 
agreements, through section 301 of the LMRA.128 The Court has 
employed the FAA for all other arbitration agreements, from one 
contained in a contract between a stock broker and customer129 to 
one contained in an application .. for registration with the New York 
Stock Exchange.130 
As Shell has noted, the procedure for bringing a claim in com-
mercial arbitration differs fundamentally from that involved in la-
bor arbitration: 
At the outset, the aggrieved plaintiffs in commercial cases have usu-
ally agreed in a signed contract to arbitrate their disputes .... This 
scenario contrasts with that of labor arbitration, in which the union 
has negotiated and signed the arbitration clause on behalf of its mem-
bers. Moreover, plaintiffs in commercial arbitration individually con-
trol the decision to proceed with a claim and may select their own 
lawyer or agent to represent their interests. They do not depend, as in 
the collective bargaining context, on [the union] to control the resolu-
tion of the dispute.131 
The primary differences in the commercial arbitration process are 
that individuals represent themselves both in the negotiation of 
commercial contracts and in the resolution of disputes arising under 
such contracts;132 neither is true in the collective bargaining context. 
Commercial and labor arbitration also differ in their use of sub-
stantive law. Commercial arbitrators - unlike labor arbitrators -
are not strictly confined to the terms of the contract when making 
awards. Commercial arbitration decisions often rely upon public 
law,133 and arbitrators are encouraged by professional arbitration 
organizations to grant awards on the merits of legal claims.134 
Summarizing the distinction between labor arbitration and com-
mercial arbitration, the Supreme Court has stated that "[i]n the 
commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. [Labor] 
arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife."135 
2. Labor Arbitration 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that individual statu-
tory claims fall outside the scope of labor arbitration.136 As this 
128. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
129. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/knerican Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
130. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
131. Shell, supra note 72, at 531. 
132. See generally GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01 
(1991) (describing the commercial arbitration process). 
133. See id. § 25.01. 
134. See Shell, supra note 72, at 532. 
135. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). 
136. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (holding that claims 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not subject to labor arbitration); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best 
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section demonstrates, however, the basis for this holding has shifted 
over time. Initially, the Court based its conclusion on two ratio-
nales. First, the Court concluded that arbitration provides a proce-
durally inappropriate forum for resolving statutory claims: 
arbitrators lack competence in interpreting statutes, the Court con-
cluded, and the procedures of arbitration do not offer the legal for-
malities available in court.137 Second, the Court concluded that the 
purpose of labor arbitration - maintaining collective industrial 
peace in the face of issues that affect an entire workforce - does 
not comport with the goal of resolving the individual statutory 
claims of individual employees.138 Recently, however, the Court re-
jected the former rationale and concluded that arbitration does pro-
vide a procedurally adequate forum for hearing statutory 
disputes.139 The Court nevertheless has indicated that the latter ra-
tionale remains valid; enforcing the collective obligations of labor 
and management still does not jibe with enforcing individual 
rights.140 As a result, this section argues, labor arbitration remains 
an inappropriate forum for resolving individual statutory claims. 
In the 1974 case Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,141 the 
Supreme Court held that arbitration pursuant to a collective bar-
gaining agreement does not bar a subsequent Title VII claim.142 
The plaintiff pursued arbitration in compliance with the collective 
bargaining agreement, claiming that his employer had fired him in 
violation of the agreement. The collective bargaining agreement 
prohibited dismissals without "just cause" and also prohibited dis-
crimination on the basis of race. After the arbitrator ruled that the 
employer had cause to discharge the employee, the employee 
brought a Title VII claim in federal court alleging that he had been 
fired on the basis of race. The district court dismissed the case, 
holding that the arbitral decision had disposed of the discrimination 
claim. The court of appeals affirmed.143 
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (holding that claims under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938 are not subject to labor arbitration); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 
36 (1974) (holding that labor arbitration cannot resolve claims under Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act). 
137. 415 U.S. at 57-58; see infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. 
138. See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 291; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739-40; Gardner-Denver, 415 
U.S. at 51, 55; see also infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text. 
139. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); see also infra notes 173-80 and accom-
panying text. _ 
140. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991); see also infra 
notes 189-96 and accompanying text. 
141. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
142. 415 U.S. at 59-60. 
143. 415 U.S. at 45-54. 
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Title VII provides a 
remedy that is independent of the remedies available under a col-
lective bargaining agreement.144 The Court concluded that the 
plaintiff was entitled to a trial de novo on his Title VII claim.145 
The Court therefore allowed employees under a union contract to 
pursue arbitration, litigation, or both: 
We think ... that the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor 
disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory employment 
practices can best be accommodated by permitting an employee to 
pursue fully both his remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of 
his collective-bargaining agreement and his cause of action under 
Title VII.146 
The Court cited two reasons for its decision. First, the Court stated 
that arbitration provides a procedurally inadequate forum for 
resolving statutory claims.147 The competence of labor arbitrators, 
the Court wrote, "pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the 
law of the land."148 Moreover, arbitral procedures do not allow for 
the extensive fact-finding necessary to resolve Title VII claims.149 
In addition, arbitrators generally are not required to produce writ-
ten opinions explaining the rationale for their decisions, and thus, 
arbitration does not create a body of decisions informing employers 
of the legality of their actions.150 
Second, the Court found that because a collective bargaining 
agreement constitutes a contract between an employer and a union 
- not an employer and an individual employee - it cannot be 
used to waive an individual employee's statutory rights.151 A union 
may waive through negotiation any rights statutorily conferred 
upon it, but a union may not waive an individual employee's statu-
tory rights. For instance, a union may waive its statutory right to 
strike, because this right properly belongs to the union.152 The right 
to be free from race discrimination, in contrast, belongs to the indi-
144. 415 U.S. at 43. 
145. 415 U.S. at 60. 
146. 415 U.S. at 59-60. 
147. 415 U.S. at 56 ("Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contrac-
tual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution 
of rights created by Title VII."). · 
148. 415 U.S. at 57 (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 
U.S. 574, 581-83 (1960)). 
149. 415 U.S. at 57. 
150. 415 U.S. at 57. The Court also found deficiencies in other aspects of arbitral proce-
dures: "(T]he usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to 
civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under 
oath, are often severely limited or unavailable." 415 U.S. at 57-58. 
151. 415 U.S. at 47-54; see also Shell, supra note 72, at 519 n.48. 
152. 415 U.S. at 51 ("It is true, of course, that a union may waive certain statutory rights 
related to collective activity, such as the right to strike ••.. These rights are conferred on 
employees collectively to foster the processes of bargaining and properly may be exercised or 
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vidual employee, not to her union.153 A union, therefore, may not 
waive an individual's right to a judicial forum for a Title VII claim 
because Title VII "represent[ s] a congressional command that each 
employee be free from discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the 
rights conferred can form no part of the collective-bargaining pro-
cess .... "154 
The decision in Gardner-Denver reflects the Supreme Court's 
acknowledgment that the process of labor arbitration creates a 
tension between the interests of individual employees and their 
unions.155 As discussed above, once an employee files a grievance, 
the union, not the individual employee, pursues it.156 A union may 
decide not to spend its resources on a particular grievance.151 If 
individual statutory claims were subject to labor arbitration, the in-
dividual claimant could be bound by her union's handling of the 
claim.158 To resolve the potential conflict between individual and 
collective rights, the Gardner-Denver Court concluded that collec-
tive bargaining agreements cannot grant unions the authority to de-
cide how, or whether, to press an individual's Title VII claim.159 
As a result of Gardner-Denver, individual employees are free to 
bring Title VII claims in federal court regardless of the results of 
labor arbitration.160 In two subsequent cases, the,Court extended 
its decision in Gardner-Denver to individual rights guaranteed by 
relinquished by the union as collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits for 
union members." (citations omitted)). 
153. 415 U.S. at 51 ("Title VII, on the other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it 
concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal employment 
opportunities."). 
154. 415 U.S. at 51. 
155. Cf. Shell, supra note 72, at 519 n.48 ("The collective bargaining agreement is a con-
tract between the union and the employer, not between the individual employee and the 
employer. Thus, the employee who files a grievance is, in essence, bringing a violation of the 
agreement to the attention of the union, which has the contractual right to contest the 
matter."). 
156. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text. 
157. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 742 (1981) ("[E]ven 
if the employee's claim were meritorious, his union might, without breaching its duty of fair 
representation, reasonably and in good faith decide not to support the claim vigorously in 
arbitration."). 
158. This result would flow from the great deference courts give to arbitral decisions. See 
supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
159. 415 U.S. at 51. As Chief Justice Burger later explained, the Court in Gardner-
Denver was concerned that given the history of discrimination within unions, granting unions 
exclusive authority to press an individual member's discrimination claim through arbitration 
"would have made the foxes guardians of the chickens." Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 750 (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting). 
160. 415 U.S. at 59-60 (ordering de nova review of the plaintiff's Title VII claim despite 
completed arbitration involving the same factual issues). It should be noted, however, that 
the Court allowed the district court to admit the arbitral decision as evidence in the Title VII 
claim and provided that this evidence be "accorded such weight as the court deems appropri-
ate." 415 U.S. at 60 n.21. 
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other statutes, 161 declaring that the principles embodied in Gard-
ner-Denver apply to statutes "designed to provide minimum sub-
stantive guarantees to individual workers."162 
Although Gardner-Denver makes clear that arbitration does not 
preclude federal claims, courts could nonetheless require claimants 
to exhaust arbitral remedies before seeking judicial relief. The 
Supreme Court, however, has effectively rejected such an exhaus-
tion requirement for claims based on individual statutory rights. In 
International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Rob-
bins & Myers, Inc., 163 the Court held that a Title VII claim would 
not be tolled during the pendency of arbitration proceedings. The 
Court found that the decision in Gardner-Denver mandated that 
there would be no tolling because that decision had clearly estab-
lished the independence of the contractual and statutory dispute 
mechanisms.164 As Judge Harry Edwards has observed, an exhaus-
tion requirement for Title VII claims would be inconsistent with the 
Court's decision in Robbins & Myers because it would have the ef-
fect of rendering many Title VII claims time-barred while still in 
arbitration - hardly a result consistent with the independence of 
the two remedies.16s 
Lower courts have also concluded that requiring exhaustion of 
arbitral remedies would run counter to the principles of Gardner-
Denver.166 These courts reason that, given the Supreme Court's 
161. In Barrentine, the Supreme Court held that the principles of Gardner-Denver apply 
to cases brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 
(1988). 450 U.S. at 745-46. Then, in McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 
(1984), the Court held that Gardner-Denver applies to causes of action brought pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Under these cases, arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining 
agreement holds no preclusive effect for a subsequent FLSA or § 1983 claim. 
162. 450 U.S. at 737 (emphasis added). 
163. 429 U.S. 229, 230 (1976). 
164. 429 U.S. at 236. 
165. See Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1500-01 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., 
concurring). Judge Edwards also cited the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Railway 
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), as additional evidence that the Supreme Court has 
rejected an exhaustion requirement for individual statutory claims. See 925 F.2d at 1501. In 
Railway Express, the Court held that a plaintiff seeking relief under both Title VII and 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) need not exhaust her Title VII remedies before bringing the § 1981 
claim. The Court stated that it was "disinclined, in the face of congressional emphasis upon 
the existence and independence of the two remedies" to express a preference for one remedy 
by requiring its procedures to be exhausted before the other's procedures could be invoked. 
421 U.S. at 461. As Judge Edwards noted, Railway Express indicates that the Court views an 
"exhaustion requirement as simply inconsistent with the notion of distinct and independent 
remedies." 925 F.2d at 1501. 
166. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that following 
Gardner-Denver, race discrimination claimants need not pursue otherwise-required arbitra-
tion); Gibson v. Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 543 F.2d 1259, 1266 n.14 (9th 
Cir. 1976) ("Exhaustion of [arbitral remedies] is .•• not a precondition to a Title VII suit."); 
Waters v. W1Sconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1316 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that "plaintiffs 
could properly proceed .•. under section 1981 without first exhausting any contractual reme-
dies .... "); see also Hammontree, 925 F.2d at 1500 (Edwards, J., concurring) ("A close look 
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conclusion that an individual's statutory rights are independent of 
collectively bargained rights, they cannot require a plaintiff bringing 
a claim under a statute protecting individual rights to exhaust the 
remedies provided by a collective bargaining agreement.167 By not 
requiring exhaustion, these courts properly implement the Court's 
conclusion that an individual may "fully pursue" both her statutory 
rights and her rights under a collective bargaining agreement. As 
the Court made clear in Gardner-Denver, labor arbitration can only 
determine a plaintiff's collectively bargained rights - rights that 
are independent of individual statutory rights. 
3. Commercial Arbitration 
Although, as the previous section noted, the Supreme Court has 
consistently held ·that courts cannot require plaintiffs to resolve stat-
utory claims exclusively through labor arbitration, courts' willing-
ness to allow statutory claims to be resolved in commercial 
arbitration has undergone a dramatic shift in recent years. The 
Supreme Court first considered the arbitrability of statutory claims 
arising out of commercial agreements in 1953 in Wilko v. Swan.16s 
The Court in Wilko held that claims under the Securities Act of 
1933169 are not subject to a contractual agreement to arbitrate.17° 
As in the labor cases, the Court expressed basic doubts about the 
capacity of arbitrators to enforce statutory rights.171 The Court 
concluded that statutory interpretation falls within the exclusive ex-
pertise of the judiciary.172 In 1989, however, the Court explicitly 
overruled Wilko and held that commercial arbitrators may decide 
purely statutory claims.173 The Court concluded that the decision in 
Wilko was based on an "outmoded presumption of disfavoring 
arbitration."174 
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,11s 
the Court endorsed a two-part test for determining the arbitrability 
at Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald, and their progeny, reveals that the logic driving the 
Court's holding in those cases would also preclude an exhaustion of remedies ... require-
ment for the statutes involved."). 
167. See, e.g., Gibson, 543 F.2d at 1266 n.14. 
168. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77b (1988). 
170. 346 U.S. at 438. 
171. 346 U.S. at 435-37 (reasoning that arbitration is inappropriate because arbitrators 
lack legal training and because arbitration does not create a sufficient written opinion). 
172. See 346 U.S. at 437 ("[T]he protective provisions of the Securities Act require the 
exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness."). 
173. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485-86 
(1989). 
174. 490 U.S. at 481. 
175. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
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of statutory claims under the FAA.176 Under this test, a court first 
must determine as a matter of contract interpretation whether the 
parties' agreement to arbitrate reaches the statutory claim as-
serted.177 If so, a court should then consider, under principles of 
statutory interpretation, whether Congress intended to foreclose ar-
bitration of the claim.178 Such a congressional intent to bar arbitra-
tion of a statutory claim must be apparent from the text, legislative 
history, or purposes of the statute under which the claim is as-
serted.119 Current Supreme Court precedent therefore establishes a 
presumption that statutory claims will be subject to commercial ar-
bitration under the FAA, rebuttable by evidence of congressional 
intent to the contrary. 
The Court's reasoning in commercial arbitration cases rejects 
the first of Gardner-Denver's rationales - that arbitration provides 
a procedurally inadequate substitute for a judicial forum.18° For 
several years after Mitsubishi, it was therefore unclear whether la-
bor arbitration, like commercial arbitration, would be considered 
an adequate forum for statutory claims. In the 1991 case Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 181 the Supreme Court clarified the 
matter, indicating that Gardner-Denver's second rationale - that 
labor arbitration is inappropriate for individual statutory claims be-
cause of the tension between individual and collective representa-
tion - remains valid. In so doing, the next section demonstrates, 
the Court upheld the distinction between labor and commercial ar-
bitration and affirmed the continuing vitality of the earlier labor 
arbitration cases. 
4. Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims in Commercial 
Arbitration: Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 
The Supreme Court held in Gilmer that commercial arbitration 
provides an adequate forum for hearing a claim of employment dis-
crimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (ADEA).182 Gilmer represents the first occasion on which the 
176. 473 U.S. at 628. 
177. 473 U.S. at 628. 
178. The Court stated: "Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held 
to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies 
for the statutory rights at issue." 473 U.S. at 628. 
179. In Mitsubish4 the Court said that congressional intent must be "deducible from [the 
statute's] text or legislative history." 473 U.S. at 628. The Court has subsequently stated that 
statutory claims may also be exempted from commercial arbitration if there is an "inherent 
conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes." Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987). 
180. Mitsubish4 473 U.S. at 628-40. 
181. 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991}. 
182. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988). The facts of Gilmer are as follows. Robert Gilmer was 
hired by Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation in May 1981, and as part of the terms of em-
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Court has upheld the arbitrability of a statutory civil rights claim. 
The Court in Gilmer did not, however, overrule Gardner-Denver 
and its progeny. To the contrary, the Court expressly reaffirmed 
the validity of its decisions regarding labor arbitration, implicitly 
limiting its decision to commercial arbitration.183 In so doing, this 
section argues, Gilmer suggests that the arbitrability of statutory 
claims depends primarily on the type of contract containing the ar-
bitration agreement, not on the type of statutory claim asserted.184 
In Gilmer, the Supreme Court strongly implied that the stan-
dard for determining the arbitrability of statutory discrimination 
claims depends on the type of contract containing the arbitration 
agreement. The arbitration clause at issue in Gilmer appeared in a 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) registration application filed by 
the plaintiff. Because the clause did not appear in the plaintiff's 
contract with his employer, the Court concluded that the agreement 
was governed by the FAA, which covers commercial contracts.185 
The Court therefore applied Mitsubishi's two-part test,186 holding 
that the parties had agreed to arbitrate and that the plaintiff had 
not demonstrated that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of 
ADEA claims.187 In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that because 
the plaintiff was required to submit the application as a term of his 
employment, the arbitration agreement was part of the plaintiff's 
employment contract.188 Stevens further argued that employment 
contracts are not covered by the FAA and that the Mitsubishi test 
should not apply. Thus, both the majority and dissenting opinions 
in Gilmer seem to agree that the test for determining the arbi-
ployment, Interstate required Gilmer to register with the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE). The NYSE registration application contained a clause requiring Gilmer to arbitrate 
"any dispute, claim or controversy" arising between Gilmer and Interstate. 500 U.S. at 23. 
In 1987, Interstate fired Gilmer, and Gilmer filed an age discrimination claim under the 
ADEA. Interstate responded by moving to compel arbitration under the arbitration agree-
ment contained in the NYSE application. 500 U.S. at 23-24. 
In upholding the arbitrability of the ADEA claim, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
NYSE application containing the arbitration clause was not an employment contract of any 
kind and therefore was governed by the FAA. 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. Consequently, the Court 
applied Mitsubishi's two-part test. 500 U.S. at 26. The Court then found that Gilmer failed 
to meet his burden of proving that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of ADEA 
claims. 500 U.S. at 26-33. 
183. 500 U.S. at 33-35. 
184. Cf. Shell, supra note 72, at 514 (arguing that in determining the arbitrability of statu-
tory claims, courts have not adequately considered the distinction between labor and com-
mercial arbitration). 
185. 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. See supra notes 125-27 (discussing the coverage of the FAA). 
The Court avoided the question of whether the FAA excludes all contracts of employment, 
or only certain employment contracts, by deciding that the contract at issue was not an em-
ployment contract at all. 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. See infra note 232 and accompanying text. 
186. 500 U.S. at 26. 
187. 500 U.S. at 26. 
188. 500 U.S. at 39-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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trability of statutory disputes turns on the type of contract contain-
ing the arbitration agreement. 
The Gilmer majority explicitly distinguished its holding from 
that of Gardner-Denver, suggesting that the decision in Gardner-
Denver remains good law.189 The Court distinguished the labor ar-
bitration cases on three grounds. First, the Court stated that the 
arbitration clauses at issue in the Gardner-Denver line of cases did 
not constitute agreements to arbitrate individual statutory claims. 
Rather, according to the Court, the collective bargaining agree-
ments in those cases granted the labor arbitrator authority only to 
· resolve questions involving interpretation of the collective bargain-
ing agreement.190 Because the contractual language in Gilmer and 
Gardner-Denver was effectively the same, this statement cannot be 
read as distinguishing the language of the specific agreements at 
issue in the cases.191 Instead, it should be read to distinguish the 
scope of labor arbitration from that of commercial arbitration. 
Second, the Gilmer Court reaffirmed the vitality of Gardner-
Denver in the special context of union representation. The Court 
stated that an "important concern [in Gardner-Denver] was the ten-
sion between collective representation and individual statutory 
rights."192 This tension, the Court stated, was absent in the non-
union context.193 In recharacterizing this concern, already voiced in 
Gardner-Denver, the Gilmer Court reaffirmed Gardner-Denver's 
resolution of the tension between individual rights and union repre-
189. 500 U.S. at 35. 
190. In Gilmer, the Court stated that the Gardner-Denver line of cases 
did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory 
claims. Rather, they involved the quite different issue whether arbitration of contract-
based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims. Since the em-
ployees there had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators 
were not authorized to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably 
was held not to preclude subsequent statutory actions. 
500 U.S. at 35. 
191. The NYSE registration in Gilmer called for arbitration of "any dispute, claim or 
controversy." 500 U.S. at 23. In Gardner-Denver, the arbitration agreement provided for 
arbitration of "any trouble" arising in the workplace. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 
U.S. 36, 40 n.3 (1974). The arbitration agreement in Barrentine provided for the arbitration 
of "any controversy which might arise." Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 
U.S. 728, 731 n5 (1981). The difference between the arbitration agreement in Gilmer and 
those in Gardner-Denver and Barrentine, therefore, does not derive from differences in con-
tractual language. Instead, the Court read essentially the same contractual language in the 
commercial context to include potential statutory disputes, but in the labor context, the 
Court limited the scope of the clause to contractual conflicts. This distinction between Gard-
ner-Denver and Gilmer comports well with the Court's differing models of labor and com-
mercial arbitration. Restricting labor arbitration to disputes over the collective bargaining 
agreement keeps labor arbitration focused on its fundamental goal - providing a method for 
resolving workplace tensions and thus avoiding strikes. See supra notes 120-22 and accompa-
nying text. 
192. 500 U.S. at 35. 
193. 500 U.S. at 35 (noting the "potential disparity in interests between a union and an 
employee"). · 
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sentation - a resolution that allows individual employees to liti-
gate statutory claims despite the availability of labor arbitration.194 
Third, the Gilmer Court pointed out that labor arbitration cases 
such as Gardner-Denver were not decided under the FAA, which 
reflects a " 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,'" 
but instead were decided under the LMRA, which reflects very dif-
ferent concems.195 As discussed above, the primary goal of the 
LMRA in supporting arbitration is to promote industrial peace - a 
goal that the Supreme Court has concluded is incompatible with 
enforcing individual rights.196 
The three distinctions identified in Gilmer between the commer-
cial contract in that case and the labor contracts in the Gardner-
Denver line of cases indicate that courts determining the arbi-
trability of statutory claims must apply one standard to arbitration 
under collective bargaining agreements and another standard to ar-
bitration under commercial agreements. Arbitration of statutory 
claims pursuant to collective bargaining agreements should follow 
the precedent established in Gardner-Denver and its progeny. 
These cases hold that individual employees should not be required 
to arbitrate claims based on statutes "designed to provide minimum 
substantive guarantees to individual workers."197 When commer-
cial contracts are involved, however, the test established in Mitsu-
bishi makes clear that arbitration is an appropriate forum for 
resolving statutory disputes unless Congress intended to preclude 
arbitration of the dispute.198 The next section assesses section 510 
claims in light of the different standards applied to labor and com-
mercial arbitration. 
B. Applying the Mitsubishi and Gardner-Denver Standards to 
the Arbitration of Section 510 Claims 
This section argues that under recent Supreme Court decisions 
section 510 plaintiffs must exhaust arbitral remedies pursuant to 
commercial contracts but need not arbitrate pursuant to collective 
bargaining agreements. This section further concludes, however, 
that the unique concerns that preclude labor arbitration of individ-
ual statutory claims are absent in the context of individual employ-
ment contracts.199 Consequently, courts should enforce arbitration 
194. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 59-60; supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text. 
195. 500 U.S. at 35 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)). 
196. See supra notes 120-22, 151-59 and accompanying text. 
197. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737 (1981). 
198. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text. 
199. The Supreme Court has not stated whether individual employment contracts should 
be governed by labor or commercial precedent. See infra note 232 and accompanying text. 
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of section 510 claims when an arbitration agreement appears in an 
individual employment contract. 
1. Arbitration of Section 510 Claims Pursuant to Collective 
Bargaining Agreements 
Section 510 falls within the category of statutory provisions 
"designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual 
workers. "200 It guarantees individual employees protection against 
employment discrimination on the basis of eligibility for benefits.201 
Because section 510 falls within the type of claim precluded from 
labor arbitration by Gardner-Denver,202 courts should not require 
arbitration of section 510 claims when the arbitration agreement 
appears in a collective bargaining agreement. 
The principles announced in Gardner-Denver with respect to the 
arbitrability of Title VII discrimination claims apply with equal 
force to section 510 discrimination claims. Unions lack authority to 
negotiate over an individual's statutory rights.203 Thus, an em-
ployee should not lose her right to bring a section 510 claim in fed-
eral court as a result of an arbitration agreement contained in a 
collective bargaining agreement.204 As with Title VII, the rights 
conferred by BRISA section 510 "can form no part of the collec-
tive-bargaining process."205 Gardner-Denver and its progeny make 
clear that labor arbitrators have no authority to decide an em-
ployee's rights under a statute, such as BRISA section 510, that was 
designed to offer individuals minimum workplace protections. 
Furthermore, employees bringing section 510 claims should not 
be required to rely on their unions to advocate their claims. For a 
variety of legitimate reasons, a union may choose not to press an 
individual member's claim.206 Thus, a union's decision not to pur-
sue an employee's claim with diligence should not bind a section 
200. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 737; see supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text. 
201. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. 
202. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
203. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text. 
204. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) 
(holding that labor arbitrators may interpret only the terms of the agreement and may not 
independently interpret public laws). 
205. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51. 
206. As the Court has noted: 
[W]hen, as is usually the case, the union has exclusive control over the "manner and 
extent to which an individual grievance is presented," there is an additional reason why 
arbitration is an inadequate substitute for judicial proceedings. The union's interests and 
those of the individual employee are not always identical or even compatible. As a 
result, the union may present the employee's grievance less vigorously, or make different 
strategic choices, than would the employee. 
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 291 (1984) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19); see also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 
450 U.S. 728, 742 (1981). 
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510 claimant. Courts therefore should not require section 510 
claimants to exhaust arbitral remedies pursuant to a collective bar-
gaining agreement. 
2. Arbitration of Section 510 Claims Pursuant to Commercial 
Contrac~ -
The two-part test established by the Supreme Court in Mitsu-
bishi determines the arbitrability of section 510 claims arising out of 
commercial contracts.207 Under the first part of the test, a court 
must determine whether an arbitration.clause reaches a section 510 
claim.208 This requires the court to interpret the specific arbitration 
clause at issue. The Supreme Court has indicated that "any doubts 
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in 
favor of arbitration."209 This suggests that courts should read arbi-
tration clauses purporting to require arbitration of "all disputes" to 
cover any possible dispute between the parties, including statutory 
claims.210 For example, the arbitration clause at issue in Gilmer, 
which the Supreme Court concluded covered a statutory age dis-
crimination claim, provided for arbitration over "any dispute, claim 
or controversy" arising between the parties.211 Section 510 claims, 
therefore, may be subject to arbitration even if the arbitration 
clause does not refer specifically to section 510.212 
If a court concludes that an arbitration agreement covers a sec-
tion 510 claim, the second part of the Mitsubishi test requires that 
the claim be subject to arbitration unless Congress specifically in-
tended to preclude arbitration of section 510 claims.213 The text, 
legislative history, and underlying purposes of BRISA do not 
demonstrate such an intent. The text of BRISA makes no mention 
of arbitration. BRISA section 514( d), however, does state that 
"[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, 
modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United 
States ... or any rule or regulation issued under any such law."214 
In Gilmer, the Court reaffirmed this reasoning, stating that Gardner-Denver adequately 
resolved "the tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights, a 
concern not applicable" to commercial arbitration. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). 
2<rl. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); 
supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text. 
208. See 473 U.S. at 628. 
209. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). 
210. See supra note 191. 
211. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). 
212. See Mitsubishi, 473_ U.S. at 625 (rejecting the argument that in order to arbitrate a 
statutory claim, the arbitration clause must refer to the particular statute). 
213. 473 U.S. at 628; see supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. 
214. 29 u.s.c. § 1144(d) (1988). 
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In the absence of authority to the contrary, this provision confirms 
the congressional support for commercial arbitration found in the 
FAA.21s 
Several other provisions of BRISA, however, may appear to 
support a congressional intent to· foreclose arbitration of BRISA-
based claims. One such provision can be found in BRISA's decla-
ration of policy, in which Congress announced its intention of pro-
viding claimants "ready access to the Federal courts."216 Enforcing 
arbitration agreements arguably denies section 510 claimants the 
access to the courts that Congress intended. This argument, how-
ever, misconstrues congressional intent. Congress's intent to pro-
vide access to the courts is not equivalent to a congressional intent 
to foreclose potential plaintiffs' ability to waive that right.21' Par-
ties to arbitration agreements necessarily forgo access to the courts 
in exchange for the procedures offered by commercial arbitra-
tion.21s The FAA expresses a congressional intent to support this 
exchange. It does not follow that by providing a federal judicial 
forum for section 510 claims Congress also intended to override the 
goals of the FAA. In short, by providing section 510 claimants ac-
cess to federal courts, Congress did not prevent them from choosing 
an arbitral rather than a judicial forum. 
The fact that BRISA provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction 
for section 510 claims219 may also appear to support the argument 
that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of section 510 
claims. As the Second Circuit has noted, however, this provision 
"speaks only to which judicial forum [federal or state] is available, 
not to whether an arbitral forum is also available."22° Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court has already rejected the same argument in an-
other context. Like BRISA, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction.221 Yet the Court deter-
mined that claims under the Act are subject to arbitration.222 After 
215. See Shell, supra note 72, at 558 (arguing that§ 514{d) suggests a congressional intent 
to apply the FAA to statutory ERISA claims). 
216. 29 U.S.C. § lOOl{b) {1988). 
217. See Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116, 120 {2d Cir. 
1991) (concluding that the "ready access to Federal courts" provision "does not speak to 
whether Congress intended to require that parties avail themselves of that forum"): Arnulfo 
P. Sulit, Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475, 478·79 {8th Cir. 1988). 
218. As the Court stated in Mitsubishi, "By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party 
does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolu-
tion in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." 473 U.S. at 628. 
219. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1988). 
220. Bird, 926 F.2d at 120 (emphasis added). 
221. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa {1988). 
222. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987); see also 
Mitsubish~ 473 U.S. at 629 {finding claims under the Sherman Act arbitrable despite exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction). 
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the Court's decision, the Second Circuit concluded that " 'any claim 
that the jurisdictional language of BRISA evidences a congressional 
intent to foreclose arbitrability would appear to be untenable.' "223 
The legislative history of BRISA similarly does not indicate a 
congressional intent to foreclose arbitration of section 510 claims. 
The Senate version of BRISA contained a provision requiring each 
plan to provide for arbitration over "any dispute between the ad-
ministrator of the plan and any participant or beneficiary of the 
plan."224 Because plan administrators may be subject to section 510 
as well as other statutory BRISA claims,225 this provision would 
have allowed for the arbitration of statutory claims. Although this 
provision was eliminated by the Conference Committee, its elimi-
nation does not demonstrate a rejection of arbitration. In contrast 
to the Senate version of BRISA, the House version included no 
provision whatsoever for appeal of benefits decisions.226 As a com-
promise, the Conference Committee drafted section 503, which re-
quires plans to include some procedure for appealing a plan 
administrator's denial of benefits.227 Although section 503 does not 
mention arbitration, the Conference Committee report indicates 
that section 503 represents a compromise between mandating that 
plans include a specific procedure - such as arbitration - and not 
mandating that plans include any review procedure at all.228 By 
making no mention of arbitration, section 503 therefore avoids the 
question of the arbitrability of statutory BRISA claims, leaving this 
question to be determined by existing law - the LMRA for labor 
arbitration and the FAA for commercial arbitration. 
Finally, arbitration pursuant to a commercial contract does not 
undermine the underlying purposes of section 510. The purpose of 
section 510 is to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of 
223. Bird, 926 F.2d at 120 (quoting Southside Internists Group v. Janus Capital Corp., 741 
F. Supp. 1536, 1541 (N.D. Ala. 1990)); see also Shell, supra note 72, at 557-58 (arguing that 
McMahon and Mitsubishi demonstrate that exclusive federal jurisdiction does not preclude 
arbitrability). 
224. H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 691 (1973), reprinted in 2 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, 
COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, U.S. SENATE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EM-
PLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY Acr OF 1974, at 1883, 2096 (1976) [hereinafter 
LEGIS. HIST.]. 
225. Section 510 prohibits "any person," not only employers, from discriminating against 
participants and beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988). In addition, plan administrators may 
be subject to another statutory claim - breach of fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Acosta v. Pacific 
Enters., 950 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1991). 
226. SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SENATE VERSION AND THE HOUSE VER-
SION OF H.R. 2 To PROVIDE FOR PENSION REFORM 24 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGIS. HIST., 
supra note 224, at 5249, 5274. 
227. See id. at 25, reprinted in 3 LEms. HIST., supra note 224, at 5275; supra notes 38, 67-
68 and accompanying text. 
228. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 42, at 327, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5108. 
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eligibility for benefits.229 In Gilmer, the Supreme Court concluded 
that private arbitration could provide an adequate forum for pro-
moting the "important social policies" served by the antidiscrimina-
tion law embodied in the ADEA: "We do not perceive any 
inherent inconsistency between those policies . . . and enforcing 
' agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims. "230 Like the 
ADEA at issue in Gilmer, section 510 serves the important social 
value of eliminating one category of arbitrary discrimination. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has concluded that commercial ar-
bitration provides an adequate forum for enforcing even claims im-
plicating "important social policies."231 
Thus, the text, legislative history, and purposes of ERISA sec-
tion 510 do not indicate a congressional intent to preclude arbitra-
tion. Under the test established by the Supreme Court in 
Mitsubishi, courts should tlierefore enforce agreements in commer-
cial contracts to arbitrate such claims. 
3. Arbitration Pursuant to Individual Employment Contracts 
Neither labor arbitration precedent nor commercial arbitration 
precedent clearly controls the arbitrability of statutory claims pur-
suant to individual employment contracts.232 It therefore remains 
229. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. 
230. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991). 
231. 500 U.S. at 28 ("The Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RICO, and 
the Securities Act of 1933 all are designed to advance important public policies, but • , • 
claims under those statutes are appropriate for arbitration."). 
232. Gardner-Denver de~ls only with arbitration pursuant to collectively bargained arbi-
tration agreements. Individual employment contracts do not fall within the scope of the 
LMRA, and therefore Gardner-Denver's reasoning can apply only by analogy. Mitsubishi, 
on the other hand, involves commercial arbitration under the FAA. The FAA may not apply 
to arbitration under individual employment contracts because § 1 of the FAA excludes "con-
tracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged 
in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Lower courts are divided over the 
scope of this exclusion. Some courts read the exclusion quite broadly to exempt all employ-
ment contracts from the terms of the FAA. See, e.g., Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1120 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting in dictum that "the FAA by its 
own terms does not apply to employment contracts"). Other courts read the exclusion much 
more narrowly, concluding that it excludes only the contracts of workers engaged in the 
transportation industry. See, e.g., Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971); Sig-
nal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec., Radio & Machine Workers, 235 F.2d 298, 302 (2d 
Cir. 1956). The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue. In Gilmer, the Court avoided 
the question by deciding that the securities registration application was not an employment 
contract, despite the fact that submitting the application was required as a term of Gilmer's 
employment. See 500 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court today •.. skirts the 
antecedent question of whether the coverage of the Act even extends to arbitration clauses 
contained in employment contracts, regardless of the subject matter of the claim at issue 
••.• "); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in 
Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary's Failure of Statutory Vtsion, 
1991 J. D1sP. RESoL. 259, 272-79 (arguing that the Gilmer Court opted for a restrictive defini-
tion of employment contract in order to avoid confronting the scope of the FAA employment 
contract exclusion). 
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unclear whether the reasoning of Mitsubishi or of Gardner-Denver 
controls the arbitrability of section 510 claims when an arbitration 
clause appears in an individual employment contract. Nevertheless, 
the principles guiding the Supreme Court in its labor arbitration 
cases and its commercial arbitration cases support enforcing arbi-
tration of statutory claims, including those under BRISA section 
510, pursuant to individual employment contracts. 
Although the Supreme Court has held that claims raising indi-
vidual statutory rights are not subject to labor arbitration,233 this 
conclusion stands as an exception to the general policy of enforcing 
agreements to arbitrate. The rationale for the exception derives 
from the distinct nature of labor arbitration, which seeks to main-
tain labor-management relations and avoid strikes.234 This ration-
ale is inapplicable to arbitration pursuant to individual employment 
contracts. Arbitration under individual employment contracts 
seeks only to resolve a particular dispute between employee and 
employer.235 As in the commercial context, arbitration is desirable 
in the individual employment context in order to resolve disputes 
cheaply and efficiently.236 Arbitration of individual employment 
contracts is directed at avoiding the expense of a trial, not the ex-
pense of a strike. As such, arbitration of individual employment 
contracts parallels commercial arbitration, not labor arbitration. 
Arbitration under individual employment contracts also lacks 
the "tension between collective representation and individual statu-
tory rights"237 that precludes labor arbitration of statutory claims. 
Although employees subject to a collective bargaining agreement 
must rely on a union to pursue arbitration of their grievances,238 
nonunionized employees decide for themselves whether to bring a 
claim to arbitration. Requiring individual employees to arbitrate 
statutory claims does not force them to rely on a union to press 
their claims. Thus, the rationale that supports an exception in the 
context of labor law to the general rule of enforcing arbitration 
agreements is absent in the context of individual employment 
contracts. 
CONCLUSION 
BRISA section 510 provides a judicial remedy for any employee 
whose employer discriminated against her to prevent her from ob-
taining benefits under an employer-sponsored pension or welfare 
233. See supra section 111.A.2. 
234. See supra notes 117-22, 151-54 and accompanying text. 
235. See WILNER, supra note 132, § 1.01. 
236. See id. 
237. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). 
238. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. 
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plan. Two private remedies may also be available: remedies 
through the plan's appeals procedure and remedies through con-
tract-based arbitration. This Note has examined whether plaintiffs 
bringing section 510 claims must first exhaust plan-based or arbitral 
remedies before resorting to the federal courts. 
Courts should not require section 510 plaintiffs to exhaust plan 
procedures before resorting to the courts. Courts generally apply 
an exhaµstion requirement in order to resolve the tension between 
conflicting congressional messages: providing access to the courts 
while at the same time encouraging private dispute resolution. This 
tension, however, is absent in the context of section 510 claims. 
Nothing in the text or history of BRISA indicates that Congress 
sought to encourage the private resolution of discrimination claims 
under section 510. 
Even if courts conclude that an exhaustion requirement applies 
generally to statutory BRISA claims, courts should excuse this re-
quirement for most section 510 claims. Section 510 claims typically 
fall within the judicially created exception to exhaustion for futility 
because most plan administrators are aligned with employers - the 
party accused of discrimination under section 510. In addition, be-
cause plan procedures provide only benefits, courts should excuse 
the exhaustion of plan remedies requirement for section 510 claims 
due to the inadequacy of plan remedies. 
Arbitration agreements operate on a different premise from 
plan remedies. Potential section 510 plaintiffs may agree to arbitra-
tion by contract, whereas they do not necessarily agree upon plan-
based remedies. Whether courts should require section 510 plain-
tiffs to exhaust arbitration depends on the type of contract - and 
with it the type of arbitration - to which the parties agreed. 
Supreme Court labor law decisions indicate that courts should not 
require arbitration of section 510 claims pursuant to collective bar-
gaining agreements. The Court has concluded that arbitration pur-
suant to collective bargaining agreements cannot resolve statutory 
claims involving minimum guarantees to individual employees. 
Section 510 claims fall within this category of claims exempt from 
labor arbitration. 
The Supreme Court, however, has been much more willing to 
enforce arbitration of statutory claims pursuant to commercial con-
tracts. The Court has held that, unlike labor arbitration, commer-
cial arbitration provides an adequate forum for resolving statutory 
claims unless Congress specifically intended to preclude arbitratiop 
of the statutory claim. The text, legislative history, and underlying 
purposes of BRISA do not indicate a congressional intent to pre-
clude arbitration of section 510 claims. Courts therefore should en-
force arbitral agreements covering section 510 claims. 
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The arbitrability of section 510 claims pursuant to individual 
employment contracts remains less clear. The Supreme Court has 
not determined whether court enforcement of such arbitration 
agreements will follow labor arbitration precedent or commercial 
arbitration precedent. · Nonetheless, individual employment con-
tracts lack the tension between individual rights and collective rep-
resentation that precludes labor arbitration of statutory claims. 
Courts therefore should enforce arbitration of section 510 claims 
pursuant to individual employment contracts. 
